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The IMCO Convention on Limitation
of Shipowners' Liability:
Should the United States Ratify?
TIMOTHY F. BURR*
I. INTRODUCTION
The general legal principle which provides the basis for all limi-
tation of liability laws, allows a shipowner to limit his aggregate lia-
bility to all claimants arising out of a marine casualty. 1 The United
States law on limitation of liability has gradually spawned some seri-
ous conflicts. These problem areas include:
(1) The allowance of direct action against insurance companies;
(2) the availability of limitation to pleasure craft owners;
(3) diverse pronouncements on the standard for privity or knowl-
edge; and
(4) a lack of international uniformity.
Resolution of these conflicts does not, however, appear forthcom-
ing from the judiciary. The Supreme Court has been recently review-
ing approximately two admiralty cases per year. The few cases that it
decided often led to further confusion. 2 In November, 1976, the
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO)
3
drafted a "Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims,
1976." 4
* A.B. Harvard College cur laude 1974. 1979 J.D. Degree Candidate concen-
trating in Ocean Law at the University of Miami School of Law. Mr. Burr is Editor-
in-Chief of Lawyer of the Americas.
1. That principal was stated in 1681, in the French Ordonance de la Marine:
"The proprietors of vessels shall be responsible for the acts of the master, but they
shall be discharged by abandoning the ship and freight." For a general discussion of
limitation of liability and its history, see The Rebecca, 20 F. Cas. 373, 376 (D.Me.
1831); see also The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122 (1894).
2. See, e.g., Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972)
(Maritime tort jurisdiction); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954) (Al-
lowance of direct action against insurance companies after limitation proceedings);
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955) (Insurance as
"maritime but local").
3. IMCO is an agency of the United Nations.
4. 1977 A.M.C. 1607; 8 J. MAR. L. & COM. 533 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Convention]. The IMCO Convention originated with the Comite Maritime Interna-
tional (CMI). CMI Documentation 1974-1-111. For a general discussion of the
formulation of the IMCO Convention and its previous drafts, see Owen, Limitation
of Liability, Dynamic Aspects of Marine and Offshore Liabilities 1 (1978).
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This article will begin by tracing the development of both United
States limitation laws, and the problem areas mentioned above. The
article will then discuss the IMCO Convention, and analyze what the
possible effects on each problem area would be were the United
States to ratify the IMCO proposal. Finally, the article will examine,
from the perspective of divergent groups interested in maritime law,
whether the United States should support and ratify the IMCO Con-
vention.
II. BACKGROUND-U.S. LIMITATION LAW
One of the earliest limitation of liability statutes whose principles
are closely aligned with modern law was the British Act of 53 George
III, formulated in 1813. 5 In 1848, the Supreme Court raised the
issue of the need for United States legislation on limitation of liability
in The Lexington.6 In that case, the Court held that the shipowner
was liable for $18,000 worth of coins lost when the ship burned as a
result of the crew's negligence. The holding underscored the United
States shipowner's risks.
Perhaps both to stem what would otherwise have been a deter-
rent to the growth of the United States shipping fleet, and to equalize
competition with British shipowners, Congress passed the Limited
Liability Act in 1851.7 The Act allowed a United States shipowner to
limit liability for acts of negligence, of which he was without privity
or knowledge, to an amount equal to his interest in the vessel. That
interest was specifically defined as the value of the vessel plus her
pending freight. This very general rule lay fallow for twenty years
until Norwich Co. v. Wright" added essential refinements: (1) that
the Act applied to collision as well as cargo damage, (2) that the value
5. For a discussion of the history of limitation of liability, see Ray, Maritime
Limitation of Liability -Jurisdictional and Venue Aspects, 1966 INS. C.J. 588.
6. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchant's Bank (The Lexington), 47
U.S. (6 How.) 343 (1848).
7. Act of March 3, 1851, Ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635. 46 U.SC. §,§ 181-189. The Act
favored the U.S. shipowners more than did the British Act. "For example, an Ameri-
can owner was and still is permitted to deny all liability while pleading limitation of
liability in the alternative. English law did not give owners that option. Also, the
Supreme Court rejected the English rule that limitation applied to the value of a
vessel before the casualty and adopted the French rule that valuation was taken after
the casualty meaning that in the case of a total loss, there was for all practical pur-
poses no liability at all." Owen, supra note 4, at 2.
8. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 122-24 (1871). For a general discussion of the case's
impact on limitation law, see GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY, 818-20
(2d ed. 1975).
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of the vessel was to be measured after the collision, and (3) that pend-
ing fright was the amount collected for the carriage of goods. 9 The
amount collected from passengers was added to this total in The
Main. 10
Shortly after the Norwich Co. v. Wright decision, the Supreme
Court issued "Supplementary Rules of Practice in Admiralty."1 1
Those rules are now included in Supplemental Rule F, of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
1 2
The first substantial amendment to the Limitation Act was the
Sirovich Amendment of 1936.13 That Amendment was drafted in re-
sponse to the Morro Castle disaster, which demonstrated a funda-
mental inequity in the Act's underlying concept: that claims for per-
sonal injury and wrongful death could end up pursuing a worthless
fund, if the offending vessel were lost. One hundred and thirty-five
people died when the S.S. Morro Castle burned off the New Jersey
coast. The owners sought to limit their liability to $20,000.14 Al-
though the case was eventually settled, Congress acted to protect
subsequent claimants in similar situations. 15 The Amendment states:
In the case of any sea-going vessel, if the amount of the owner's
liability as limited under sub-section (a) is insufficient to pay all
losses in full, and the portion of such amount applicable to the
payment of losses in respect to loss of life or bodily injury is less
than $60 per ton of such vessel's tonnage, such portion shall be
increased to an amount equal to $60 per ton, to be available only
for the payment of losses in respect to loss of life or bodily in-
jury.1
6
In every case of limitation, if the owner is found to have had
privity with, or knowledge of the cause of the casualty at bar, he may
not limit his liability. 1 7 This cornerstone of the Act and of Rule F,
has been subject to varied interpretations as to when those factors
9. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 122-24.
10. The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122 (1894).
11. Supreme Court's General Admiralty Rules 54-57 (1950) as amended by Admi-
ralty Supplemental Rule F, 28 U.S.C. (1960).
12. Id.
13. 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1960).
14. For a discussion of this incident and its effects that led to the Amendment,
see GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 8, at 919-20.
15. 46 U.S.C., supra note 13.
16. Id,
17. 46 U.S.C. §§ 183(a)-183(f) (1960); Admiralty Supplemental Rule F, 28 U.S.C.
(1960).
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will be imputed to the vessel owner.' 8 This disparity of the deci-
sional law is treated as a "problem area" and will be discussed more
fully below.
Throughout the evolution of the basic procedures, provisions,
and definitions of the Act, collateral issues arose which further served
to complicate a body of law that was becoming unwieldy on its own.
Insurance was one such issue. The City of Norwich 19 is a landmark
case in this area. The issue in that case was whether the owner's hull
insurance was to be included in the limitation fund as part of "the
value of the vessel." In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that hull insur-
ance was a "collateral contract, personal to the insured," 20 and was
not to be included in the fund. This case did not decide the issue of
the availability of protection and indemnity insurance. 2 1 That cover-
age, as it relates to the limitation laws, became fraught with conflicts
because its availability to claimants by direct action or joinder is
largely a question of state law. As such, it also will be explored more
fully below.
The Limitation Act and its subsequent amendments led to sub-
stantial amounts of litigation because of statutory inequities and in-
consistencies that seemed better explained by Congressional oversight
than by legitimate policies. Despite the fact that the Limitation Act
had been formulated to protect the interest of commercial shipown-
ers, private pleasure craft owners were allowed to limit liability as
well. Moreover, that privilege was only afforded those owners who
were sufficiently provident and affluent to have a professional captain
navigate their craft. Finally, the Sirovich Amendment, when read in
conjunction with other relevant provisions of the statute, limited the
applicability of those Amendments to sea-going and not to inland ves-
sels.
22
18. For a general discussion of privity or knowledge, see, Mouldeoux, The Role
of Privity and Knowledge in the Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act, 23 Loy.
L.REv. 480 (1977).
19. 118 U.S. 468 (1886). This case was a subsequent appeal in the same litigation
as Norwich Co. v. Wright, supra note 8.
20. Id. at 495. This case was one of three decided before the Supreme Court on
the issue of insurance. See also The Scotland, 118 U.S. 507 (1886), and The Great
Western, 118 U.S. 520 (1886).
21. See Kierr, The Affect of Direct Action Statutes on P & I Insurance, 43 TUL.
L. REv. 638 (1969).
22. Compare 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1960), 46 U.S.C. § 183(f) (1960) and Admiralty
Supplemental Rule F, supra note 17, with 46 U.S.C. § 188 (1960).
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In promulgating the limitation law as it exists today and in
resolving (while in many cases creating) conflicts, the Supreme Court
was struggling with difficult policy determinations.
The truth is that the whole question after all, comes back to
this: Whether a limited liability of shipowners is consonant to pub-
lic policy or not. Congress has declared that it is, and they, and
not we, are the judges of that question.
23
Sixty-eight years later, that policy was not so clear:
Many of the conditions in the shipping industry which induced
the 1851 Congress to pass the Act no longer prevailed and later
Congresses, when they wished to aid shipping, provided subsidies
paid out of the public treasury rather than subsidies paid by in-
jured persons.
24
The economics of the shipping industry that led to the original
formulation of the Act have changed. Those changes, coupled with
growing conflicts seemingly incapable of swift judicial resolution, lead
one to examine the limitation law closely, and to compare it with
recent international developments. This is especially true where those
developments, such as the IMCO Convention, and perhaps our par-
ticipation in them, might solve many of the problems and conflicts
that characterize the present state of our limitation law.
III. THE IMCO CONVENTION-POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
TO UNITED STATES PROBLEMS
A. The IMCO Convention
The format of the IMCO proposal is markedly different from
U.S. property damage limitation law because the value of the fund
23. The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468, 495 (1886).
24. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437 (1954). Three opinions
were written in the case. Justice Frankfurter wrote an opinion for four of the Court's
members. They argued that the claims should be dismissed because if the direct
actions were allowed after the claimants recovered from the insurance companies,
there would be nothing left for the owner. Therefore the owner would have been
deprived of the benefits of his insurance. Justice Black also wrote for four members
of the Court, but expressed the opinion that direct action should be allowed. Justice
Clark had a unique view. His opinion was that direct action against the insurance
company should be stayed until the limitation proceedings had been concluded. In
that way, the owner would be assured of collecting his insurance in order to satisfy
claims against the limitation fund, while still satisfying the purposes of the direct
action statute and allowing a subsequent claim directly against the owner's insurance
company. "[I]n order to breach the deadlock ... and to enable the majority to dis-
pose of this litigation," the Frankfurter group agreed to remand the case in accor-
dance with Justice Clark's opinion.
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
does not depend on the value of the vessel after the casualty-which
could, in many cases, be zero. Rather, the size of the fund is mea-
sured by the vessel's gross tonnage, multiplied by a specified number
of units of account. 25 This latter system is used in Britain and by
other parties to the 1957 Brussels Convention.2 6  The fund is broken
down into allotments for two types of interests:
(1) The death/personal injury fund is approximately two-thirds
of the fund-passenger claims for the above are made against a sepa-
rate fund, computed in terms of the number of passengers that the
ship is certified to carry; 27 and
(2) the property damage fund is equal to the remaining ap-
proximate one-third.
COMPARATIVE LIMITATION FUNDS
UNDER THE IMCO CONVENTION
AS OF MARCH 22, 197828
Size of Vessel Death/Personal Property Damage
(Gross Tons) Injury Fund Fund Total
500 & Under $ 409,092 $ 205,161 $ 614,253
1,000 $ 716,218 $ 307,740 $ 1,023,958
5,000 $ 2,726,905 $ 1,128,380 $ 3,891,285
20,000 $ 8,899,278 $ 4,205,575 $13,104,853
50,000 $19,132,713 $ 9,328,640 $28,461,353









25. Convention 4 at Art. 6. Also called Special Drawing Rights; I SDR=$1.2285.
See generally Status Report on Limitation Liability Project, Mar. Law Assoc. Doc.
No. 612 pp. 6812-15 (March 27, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Status Report].
26. Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, Section 503; Merchant Shipping Act, 1958; as
amended, (1977); 1957 Brussels Convention on the Limitation of the Liability of the
Owners of Seagoing Ships, reproduced at 1957 A.M.C. 1971.
27. Convention at Art. 7.
28. Status Report at 6816. Amounts for 3, 10, 30 and 70 thousand gross tons and
under are omitted from this graph. Note that while under the present U.S. system,
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The Convention is very thorough in defining its terms and pro-
viding for procedures, while allowing for a great deal of flexibility by
specifying that parties to the treaty, may prescribe for local court pro-
cedures, 2 9 vessels on inland waterways, 3 0 vessels of less than 300
tons, 3 and harbor facilities. 3" An important exception to the Con-
vention's coverage is damage done by oil pollution.
3 3
B. Effects on U.S. Limitation Law
The Maritime Law Association 3 4 is a member of the commit-
tee3 5 that drafted the 1976 proposal. It is not surprising, therefore,
that many of the problems that have evolved in U.S. limitation law
have been met squarely by specific provisions of the IMCO Conven-
tion.
1. Direct Action
At common law, a right of action against an insurer was based on
privity of contract. This usually meant that the only possible plaintiff
was the assured himself. Moreover, contracts often contained a "no
action" clause which meant that the assured could only sue if he had
paid a judgment entered against him. The "no action" clause was
struck down by most states as against public policy, and what had
been an indemnity policy quickly became a liability policy.30 Third
party claimants could sue an insurer directly if: (1) a final judgment
had been obtained and, (2) the insured was insolvent. This two-step
process of first obtaining a judgment and then proceeding against the
insurance company led to the development of direct action, in order
to promote judicial economy.
3 7
small craft can limit liability for personal claims to a few hundred dollars or less,
under the Convention, vessels of 500 tons or less provide a fund over $400,000. This
will be discussed more fully below.
29. Convention at Art. 10(3).
30. Id. at Art. 15(2)(a).
31. Id. at Art. 15(2)(b).
32. Id. at Art. 6(3).
33. Id. at Art. 3(b). See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollu-
tion Damage, 9 I.L.M. 45, reproduced at 1 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 373-85 (1969).
34. The MLA is a private association of admiralty practitioners.
35. Status Report at 6812.
36. See Kierr, supro note 19, at 41.
37. Only two jurisdictions allow almost unconditional direct action. Those are Louis-
iana, 22 L.A. REV. STAT. ANN. § 655 (1968), and Puerto Rico, P.R. LAws ANN. Tit. 26,
§ 2001 (1958). Others that allow limited forms of direct action are Arkansas,
Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Florida. In Florida, the Supreme Court in Bussey v.
Shingleton, 211 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1968) construed FLA. R. CIv. PRO. 1.210(a) and
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Most of the controversies surrounding the relationship between
limitation of liability and direct action stem from broad direct action
statutes in jurisdictions such as Louisiana and Puerto Rico. This con-
troversy is illustrated by the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing.38 Five seamen drowned when
their tug collided with a bridge. The value of the tug after the allision
was $25,000. The owner and charterer sought to limit their liability to
that amount. 39  The representatives of the seamen brought a direct
action against the insurer in the same court claiming $600,000 in
damages. Justice Clark broke a 4-4 deadlock, opining that while di-
rect action under the Louisiana statute was allowable, the limitation
proceedings should be held first. Claimants could subsequently bring
an action against the insurer to recover any amount due, that was
more than the owner's limited liability. The Court's rationale was
based both on protecting the shipowner's property rights40 and defer-
ring to a state statute 41 in what was admittedly a close question.
This case changed at least two fundamental aspects of the limita-
tion proceedings. First, because the Supreme Court upheld the right
to proceed directly against the insurer pursuant to a state statute, a
plaintiff's potential recovery was supplemented from the amount of
the limitation fund, to the value of the owner's protection and
indemnity policy (P&I) coverage. Secondly, before Maryland Casu-
alty, the plaintiff had been forced to litigate exclusively in the admi-
ralty forum, as a claimant in the limitation proceeding.4 2 After Mary-
land, issues bearing on a recovery of an amount greater than the
value of the fund could be tried in the forum of the plaintiff's
choosing-including state court.
allowed the joinder of a liability insurer and its insured. Subsequently two statutes
enacted by the Florida Legislature have overruled the Bussey decision. Fla. Stat.
Section 627.7262 disallows the joinder of a motor vehicle liability insurer with its
insured, in an action to determine the latter's liability. Section 768.045 is a general
bar to the right to join the liability insurer with an insured to determine the issue of
liability. The Supreme Court has yet to give those statutes either a clear interpreta-
tion or a judicial imprimatur.
38. 347 U.S. 409 (1954). See note 24 supra.
39. $25,000 represented the value of the vessel. The $60 per ton Sirovich
Amendment does not apply to tow boats. 46 U.S.C. §§ 183(b)-183(f) (1960).
40. 347 U.S. at 425.
41. The Court noted that the vessel was owned by a Louisiana corporation. All
parties except one were from there. Moreover, the tort occurred there. 347 U.S. at
425.
42. The exception to this is the single claimant situation. In that case, the
plaintif/claimant generally cannot be deprived of his right to a jury trial in either
state or federal court. Ex Parte Green, 286 U.S. 437 (1932).
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The decision carefully guarded the shipowner's interest. The
concursus of the owner's limitation proceeding was upheld, which
both allowed the owner to satisfy his liability out of the P&I proceeds
before they became vulnerable to attack by the claimant, and allowed
the issue of liability to be decided in a single proceeding. Only the
insurers seemed hurt by the decision, although presumably they
would pass their cost on to the consumer.
The availability of the privilege of limitation was not extended to
the owner's insurer when, in 1970, the Fifth Circuit, in Olympic Tow-
ing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Corp., held that "the possibility of
higher premiums was an insufficient basis for permitting an insurer to
limit its liability" where an insurer was sued pursuant to Louisiana's
direct action statute. 43 The holding was based on the rationale that
any conflict between direct action and limitation was insignificant, as
the possibility that direct action might deplete the insurance proceeds
before the owner was able to apply them to his limitation fund was
obviated by the mandate that the limitation action proceed first. In
any case, insurers were not "vessel owners" and therefore, the court
held, they were not able to limit their liability.
4 4
Direct action amounts to a limited loop-hole in the U.S. limita-
tion law which results from and adds to a lack of uniformity in this
aspect of the federal maritime law. As such, it is available only in
those forums that have statutes permitting direct action.4 5 As indi-
cated by the holding in Maryland Casualty, while Rule F and the Act
allow any vessel owner to limit its liability, the term "owner" is re-
stricted. The term does not extend to insurers; they cannot limit lia-
bility, and consequently become open to direct attack after the limita-
tion proceedings, over and above the size of the limitation fund.
The IMCO Convention would close the loop-hole by simply ex-
panding the definition of vessel owner. Article I., subsection 6 states
that, "An insurer of liability for claims subject to limitation in accor-
dance with the rules of this convention shall be entitled to the ben-
efits of the convention to the same extent as the assured himself."' 46
If the United States adopted the IMCO Convention, direct action
would become a thing of the past. Because the insurer would be al-
43. Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1969).
44. "We therefore hold that limitation of liability under the Federal statute is a
personal defense which cannot be availed of by an insurer under Louisiana law." 419
F.2d at 238.
45. See notes 36 & 37 supra, and accompanying text.
46. Convention at Art. 1(6).
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lowed to limit its liability to the prescribed amount, the concursus of
the limitation proceeding would settle the matter. There would be no
other funds available for a subsequent attack.
2. Pleasure Craft Owners
After the enactment of §188 of the Act 47 and the formulation of
Rule F, 48 it was clear that pleasure craft owners could limit liabil-
ity. 49 In Coryell v. Phipps5" the Supreme Court gave that result a
judicial imprimatur, and also gave its last favorable ruling for a ship-
owner in a limitation case.
Courts have expressed dissatisfaction with this rule because the
policy behind the limitation act was to assist the shipowner in com-
mercial competition. That policy does not favor extending the
privilege to pleasure craft.5 1 Moreover, the ability to limit is con-
fined to those owners who can afford professional skippers, for if the
casualty occurs with the owner aboard, there is no hope of showing
that the owner was without privity or knowledge: 52
At the outset, we acknowledge that contemporary thought,
finds little reason for allowing private owners of pleasure craft to
take advantage of the somewhat drastic-for the injured
claimants-provisions of the Limitation Act. Nevertheless, the
cases, as well as Congress, have spoken with a clear voice. 53
The IMCO proposal would, in effect, though not by specific
proscription, eliminate limitations for pleasure craft, because the
minimum fund that an owner could establish would amount to over
$400,000.5 4 It is important to note, however, that the Convention
specifically provides that each party would be free to legislate both
for inland vessels, and those under 300 gross tons. 55 In evaluating
the efficacy of the Convention generally, that freedom will be
explored more fully below.
47. See, e.g., Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943); Gibboney v. Wright, 517
F.2d 1054, 1057 (5th Cir. 1970); 46 U.S.C. § 188 (1970).
48. Admiralty Supplemental Rule F, note 16 supra.
49. See note 47 supra.
50. 317 U.S. 406 (1943).
51. See Pleasure Boat Tort Liability in Admiralty: An Examination of the Limited
Liability Act and a Proposal for Reform, 50 So. CAL. L. REv. 549 (1977).
52. See text accompanying notes 56-68 infra. See also Owen supra note 4, at 1-2;
and GILMORE & BLAcK, supra note 8, at 883.
53. Gibboney v. Wright, 517 F.2d 1057, 1059 (5th Cir. 1970).
54. Convention at Art. 6(1)(a)(i); Status Report at 6816.
55. Convention at Art. 15(l)(b).
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3. Privity or Knowledge
It is generally recognized that the requirement that an owner be
without "privity or knowledge" 56 stems from a desire to protect an
owner in the event of negligence on the part of his crew, with which
he had no complicity. 5 7 In the case of a corporate shipowner, privity
or knowledge with the negligent causation of the casualty on the part
of management is sufficient to bar the owner from the right to limit
liability.58
Much of the diversity in the decisional law concerning whether
an owner has privity or knowledge centers around the fundamental
requirement of seaworthiness.5 9 The general rule was that an owner
was required to exercise "due diligence" to furnish a seaworthy
ship.60 That duty was closely connected to the "duty to control." In
Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Hicks,6' the corporation/vessel owner
was in the practice of ferrying employees to and from New York City,
across the Hudson. When winter came, and ice formed in the river,
the vessel was unseaworthy for running the river, and the corporate
manager informed the ferry's master never to operate in ice. One
day, contrary to those instructions, the ferry proceeded to cross the
icy river when it hit a floe, sank and caused considerable loss of life.
Despite the fact that the master had acted on his own, in direct con-
travention of management's instructions, the court held that the own-
ers were not entitled to limit their liability. The rationale in Spencer
was that unlike a situation where the master's negligence causes loss
of life at sea, the owners of the ferry company were in a position to
control the movements of the ferry by first ascertaining the conditions
of the river. That doctrine was developed further by the Fifth Cir-
cuit, in Avera v. Florida Towing Corp. "We also agree with the
statement that 'the proposition that the duty to control increases
along with the possibility of control.... .62 The Ninth Circuit, on
the other hand, has rejected this approach in favor of a test based on
whether the negligence or lack of due diligence was on the part of a
56. See note 18 supra.
57. See note 6 supra, and accompanying text.
58. See Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 410-12 (1943).
59. See generally GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 8, at 877-95.
60. For an analysis of the distinction between "due diligence" or "privity and
knowledge," in COGSA or The Harter Act, compare GILMORE & BLACK, supra note
6, at 879-80, with Wood, Limitation of Liability, 5 WILLAMETTE L.J. 393 (1969).
61. 285 U.S. 502 (1932).
62. 322 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1963) quoting GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF AD-
MIRALTY (lst ed. 1947).
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
managerial or a non-managerial employee, regardless of the possibil-
ity of control.
63
There is also a lack of judicial uniformity concerning whether,
and to what degree, the seaworthiness duty is delegable. The Fourth
Circuit has held that if due diligence has not been used to make a
vessel seaworthy, and if that unseaworthiness was a causal factor in
the ensuing casualty, the shipowner could not limit liability. 64 A
more widely held view is:
If the owner delegates the duty to maintain his vessel to a
qualified independent agency or to a qualified employee who does
not have managerial capacity, the 'privity or knowledge' of that
agency or of the minor employee is not that of the vessel owner
within the meaning of the limitation statute.
5
The law is also somewhat unclear as to when each party has the
burden of proof on the issue of privity or knowledge. The general
rule is that the shipowner has the burden of establishing his lack of
privity or knowledge. The issue becomes less clear, however, in cases
where the vessel in question has disappeared. A leading case is In re:
Marine Sulphur Queen, 6 wherein a converted sulphur carrier disap-
peared in the Gulf of Mexico. The Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of the owner's limitation petition, because the conver-
sion of the ship had weakened the vessel's stress resistance, making
it "unseaworthy." The court used a two part test: (1) that the claimant
establish causation between negligence or unseaworthiness and the
accident, and (2) that the owner then establish lack of privity or
knowledge. In Marine Sulphur Queen, the claimant established the
necessary causation and thus met his burden as to the first part of the
test. The petioner was unable to establish lack of privity or know-
ledge, however, because the vessel owner had approved the conver-
sion plans. In disappearance cases, therefore, much of the proof con-
cerning whether the owners may limit liability is based on speculation
and inference -because there is no sure method of reconstructing
the casualty to determine causation, and the privity or knowledge
standard is very flexible.
63. See Mouledoux, supra note 18, at 495-97.
64. Id.; See also note 60 supra. That proposition is cited in GILMORE & BLACK as
generally representative of the law of the land. Several cases and comments have
taken issue with that statement of the law. See generally notes 60 & 63 supra.
65. Wood, supra note 60, at 398.
66. 460 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1972).
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In short, the establishment of privity or knowledge on the part of
the vessel owner, as a bar to limitation, has resulted in a lack of
uniformity in several areas. First, the circuits are split as to whether
the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel increases with the possibility
of control. Secondly, courts and commentators disagree as to whether
the duty to furnish a seaworthy ship is in fact delegable at all.
Thirdly, the determination of privity or knowledge is a flexible one
which, in the case of disappearances, is especially fraught with peril.
Finally, not only is there a lack of uniformity among the various judi-
cial circuits, but within each region further differences may exist
based on the equipment and technology with which each owner oper-
ates. 67 For example, if the duty to control increases with the possi-
bility of doing so, then a corporate shipowner might in fact be
penalized for equipping his vessel with the latest communications
equipment. Courts might hold that that ability should impose a
higher duty to control the vessel's at-sea operations.
The IMCO Convention would radically change this aspect of
limitation law. Article 4. states:
A person liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it is
proved the loss resulted from his personal act or omission, commit-
ted with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with
knowledge that such loss would probably result.
The requirement of intent shifts the burden of establishing lack of
privity or knowledge from the owner to the claimant in determining
whether the petitioner 6 had intentionally or recklessly caused the
loss.
4. Lack of International Uniformity
Presently, there is a decided lack of uniformity in the interna-
tional rules of limitation of liability. The only moderately successful
international agreement in this area has been the Brussels Conven-
tion of 1957.69 That Convention was ratified by most of the major
maritime powers of Western Europe (including Great Britain), and
67. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 60.
68. Under the Convention, the following may limit liability: (1) owners, charter-
ers, managers, and operators, at Art. 1(2); (2) salvors, at Art. 1(3); and (3) insurers, at
Art. 1(6). Status Report at 6814. The intent standard increases the possibility that the
above will be able to limit liability. The Convention balances higher funds against
this relaxed standard. See text accompanying notes 88-114, infra.
69. 1957 Brussels Convention on The Limitation of the Liability of the Owners of
Seagoing Ships, reproduced at 1957 A.M.C. 1971.
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has been in force among them since the late 60's. 70 The Conven-
tion did not spark uniformity, however, because most of the major
shipping powers were not signatories. 71 The United States was one
such power.72  Consequently, there is a strong potential for forum
shopping between the nations of Western Europe on the one hand,
and the United States on the other. This potential is spurred by the
basic structural differences between the two legal systems.
The Brussels Convention, like IMCO's, is based on a fund that is
determined by the vessel's tonnage. In the United States, on the
other hand, the amount of the limitation fund is determined by the
value of the vessel after the casualty, except in the event of personal
injury or death, where the value of the vessel is less than sixty dollars
per ton. In this instance, a fund based on the vessel's tonnage is
used. For personal claims in a Brussels Convention signatory, the
value is over eighty dollars per ton. 73  Given the substantial differ-
ences between the two systems, the strategies of the petitioner and
claimant would lead them to different forums to litigate the right to
limit liability. Unless the value of petitioner's vessel were greater
than eighty dollars per ton, he would probably choose a United States
forum to file for limitation; there, for property damage claims he could
limit his liability to nothing. For personal injury/wrongful death claims,
he could limit that liability to sixty dollars per ton. On the other hand,
plaintiffs would prefer to litigate the issue of limitation in Europe,
where the minimum value of the limitation fund would be over eighty
dollars per ton, unless the value of the vessel after the casualty was
worth more than that amount.
Furthermore, there is a basic difference between the two legal
systems with respect to establishing "actual fault or privity." The U.S.
rules concerning privity or knowledge, with its variations, as dis-
cussed above, present a comparatively liberal view with respect to
the owner's right to limit liability. The British rule, on the other
hand, imposes duties on the owner to do all that he possibly could
have, to be sure that the particular casualty did not occur. 7 4 This
70. For a discussion of this convention from the United States' perspective, see
Hearings on S.3600 and S.3602 (1969); see also Owen, supra note 4, at 1-18.
71. Greece, Italy, Liberia, Panama, The United States, and The U.S.S.R. never
signed.
72. Note 70 supra. See also GILMORE& BLACK, supra note 8, at 823.
73. Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 (as amended 1977).
74. Compare The Anonity, C.A. (1961) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1177; and The Dayspring,
(1968) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 204, with Complaint of Farrell Lines, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 1354
(S.D. Ga. 1974), rev'd, 530 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1976).
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difference, while seemingly subtle, might lead the parties to prefer
different forums in which to press their claims.
United States courts have evidenced a lack of clarity in their ap-
proach to the conflicts of laws problem. An early case that went a
long way towards clouding the issue was Oceanic Steamship Naviga-
tion Co. v, Mellor (The Titanic). 75 In that case, the Court applied
the substantive/procedural dichotomy test to the international choice
of laws problem. There were three issues before the Court:
(1) Whether the owners of the British vessel, liable for a disas-
ter which occurred on the high seas and killed hundreds of foreign
nationals, could limit liability in a U.S. court,
(2) whether U.S. procedural rules would apply, and
(3) whether the amount of the owner's liability would be gov-
erned by the British rather than the U.S. law.
The Court answered both of the first two questions in the affirmative.
The third issue turned on whether the issue was substantive or pro-
cedural. The Court, treating the amount of the owner's liability as a
procedural matter, held that in U.S. courts it was within Congres-
sional power to prescribe that U.S. procedural rules should apply.76
The Court then heralded what was to follow from that holding: "We
see no absurdity in supposing that if the owner of the Titanic were
sued in different countries, each having a different rule affecting the
remedy there, the local rule should be applied in each case."
7 7
Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert Stewart & Sons,78 involved
a collision that took place in Belgian waters. Under Belgian law, 79 the
limitation fund would have been $325,000. If measured by U.S. law,
the fund would have been $1,000,000 which was the value of the
vessel. The case was remanded for a determination of which law
applied, but was eventually settled, leaving that question un-
answered. The Court had set a framework for the district court to
follow on remand, however, which clarified the expansive ruling in
The Titanic. The Court treated the degree of recovery as substantive
and directed that should the degree vary as a matter of which law
applied, then probably Belgian law would apply under the principle
that "the right to recover for a tort depends upon and is measured by
the law of the place where the tort occurred." 8 0 The distinction be-
75. 233 U.S. 718 (1914).
76. Id. at 733.
77. Id. at 734.
78. 336 U.S. 386 (1949).
79. See Ray, supra note 5, at 390-91.
80. 336 U.S. at 391.
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tween the two cases would seem to rest less on substantive/
procedural dichotomy (for both cases evince that the substantive fac-
tors probably outweighed the procedural), than on their facts. In The
Titanic, the casualty occurred on the high seas, whereas in Black
Diamond, the tort occurred in Belgian waters.
8 '
The rule seemed to have come full circle in The Mandu.8 2  In
that case, where Brazilian and German vessels collided in Brazilian
waters, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that under The
Titanic, the procedural/substantive dichotomy applied even though
the tort occurred within territorial waters of a foreign state. While the
issue of liability would be determined under Brazilian law, the limita-
tion statute of the forum would control, because those statutes relate
to the remedy rather than to the right.
When presented with similar issues, however, the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida decided that the law of Panama and not that of the
United States should control the limitation issue.8" The court noted
that the fund would differ in size depending on which law applied.
The court distinguished The Titanic 84 and held that where the
amount of the fund would so vary, the controlling law would be sub-
stantive and therefore the maxim lex locus delicti would apply.
85
It is hard to predict what effect United States ratification of the
IMCO Convention would have on international forum shopping; that
would naturally depend on the number of countries that adopted the
Convention. Given the likelihood that Brussels Convention sig-
natories will ratify it, 86 conflicts between European and U.S. forums
would be virtually eliminated. Considering the international popular-
81. See Ray, supra note 3, at 390-91.
82. 102 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1939).
83. Petition of Chadade Steamship, Co., 266 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Fla. 1966). The
Yarmouth Castle was a Panamanian cruise ship operated between Miami and ports in
the Bahamas. In the early morning hours of November 13, 1965, the vessel burned
and sank on the high seas. The vessel was owned by a Panamanian corporation 'and
flew the Panamanian flag. The passengers were primarily U.S. nationals. The crew
and officers were citizens of various foreign countries.
84. Note 75 supra.
85. The Second Circuit, in In re: Ta Chi Navigation Corp., S.A., 416 F. Supp.
371 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), reached a contrary conclusion. The court held that the U.S. Act
would apply to the petition of a Panamanian vessel owner whose vessel exploded on
the high seas en route from Japan to various U.S. ports. See also In re: Bloomfield
S.S. Co., 422 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1970), and Complaint of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 435
F. Supp. 944 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
86. See Owen, supra note 4, at 1-18.
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ity of both U.S. and British courts for litigating admiralty claims,8 7
that reconciliation would be a significant goal.
IV. MERITS OF ADOPTION
Whether or not to adopt the IMCO proposal is largely a subjec-
tive issue, with as many facets as there are special-interest groups
who might be affected by a change in the present limitation of liabil-
ity structure. Those interest groups include: (a) vessel owners, (b) tort
claimants, (c) insurers, and (d) the federal government. In evaluating
from their perspectives the providence of adopting the IMCO Con-
vention, reference will be made to the proposal's effects on the areas
of limitation discussed above.
A. The Vessel Owners
The interests of the vessel owner are paramount to a formulation
of the limitation of liability rules. Indeed, those interests were the
driving force behind the formulation of the Limitation Act. It would
seem extremely difficult, however, to arrive at a consensus as to
whether vessel owners as a class would prefer the U.S. or IMCO
limitation rules, given the wide spectrum of views that "vessel own-
ers" could express.
Owners of vessels that are engaged in commercial carriage
(common and private), would either favor the proposal or not, based
on the value of their ships. Carriers who operate modern con-
tainerized fleets might favor the proposal because the amount
suggested might be less than the value of the vessel after a minor
casualty."8 On the other hand, small pleasure craft owners would
provide a fund that would represent many times the value of their
vessel. The IMCO provision that allows member states to legislate
locally for vessels under 300 tons " would mitigage the anxiety of
small craft owners. Moreover, it would aid implementation of the
Convention domestically, as millions of constituent boat owners might
otherwise oppose ratification through their representatives in
Washington."0 There is still, however, that class of vessels, between
300-500 tons, whose minimum liability under the Convention would
87. See, e.g, M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). The court
discussed this popularity in upholding a London forum selection clause in a towage
contract.
88. Containerized vessels are often substantially under-rated on tonnage. At least
two layers of containers are often carried on deck. This amounts to effective carrying
capacity with no countervailing burden of additional registered tonnage.
89. Convention at Art. 15(2)(b).
90. Cf. Status Report at 6815, para. 9.
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be $409,092. Owners of vessels in that class, as above, would favor
the proposal or not depending on the market value of their vessels. 9 1
A second variable that would affect the 'choice of whether to
adopt a proposal is the degree of damage that the casualty incurred.
Given the basic structural differences between the sets of laws, an
owner who is liable for property damage, and who had lost his ship in
the disaster, would be much better off under the present U.S. sys-
tem. His liability would be zero. For loss of life, the value per ton is
substantially lower under the U.S. system than IMCO's proposal.
92
On the other hand, if the vessel suffers minimal damage, then the
vessel owner would probably prefer the IMCO Convention, depend-
ing on the vessel's value as described above. 93
Thirdly, an obvious variable, is whether the vessel owner hap-
pens to be a plaintiff (as in a collision case) or a defendant in the
action. Each party would naturally take opposing sides to this broad
limitation issue.
A final variable, however, would decidedly tip the scales in favor
of vessel owner support of the IMCO proposal; that variable is privity
or knowledge. The Convention requires that the claimant establish
intent or recklessness on the part of the owner, in order to defeat his
right to limit. 94 That standard, as discussed above, is much more
difficult for a claimant to meet than is the present one which places a
heavy burden on the owner of proving a lack of privity or knowledge.
Moreover, for small craft owners, the Convention would diminish a
present inequity in the law that allows a pleasure craft owner with a
negligent professional skipper to limit his liability, practically barring
that opportunity from a negligent self-operator. 95  The Convention
would allow owners in both cases to limit, absent intent or reckless-
ness.
91. There is often little correlation between size and value. This is further com-
plicated by doctrines such as the "flotilla doctrine" which may include or exclude
some kinds of tows from "value of the vessel" computations. For a general discussion
of that doctrine, see Liverpool Steam Nay. Co. v. Brooklyn E. Dis. Ter., 251 U.S.
48 (1919).
92. The U.S. value is sixty dollars per ton. 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1960). Under the
Convention, the lowest value is approximately $468 per ton, and the highest value is
approximately $1,228 per ton. These values are computed for the total fund, not
limited to the personal injury and death provisions.
93. See text accompanying notes 88-91, supra.
94. Convention at Art. 4.
95. Status Report at 6815, para. 9.
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B. Tort Claimants
"The U.S. delegation to the IMCO Conference declined to sign
the Convention because it thought that the limits of liability were too
low. However, the Delegation's report concludes with this statement:
'The Delegation believes that the limitation requirement es-
tablished by the new Convention is technically sound, and pro-
vides a good model if new U.S. legislation on limitation is under-
taken. Of course, the legislation would have to provide high
enough limitation amounts to effect a fair balancing of the interest
of ship owners and claimants.' "'9
There has long been an interest in revising the amounts available
under U.S. limitation law. 97 Tort claimants would naturally favor no
limitation at all. Inasmuch as the IMCO proposal would increase the
amount available for them, 98 it can be safely assumed that given a
choice between the present system and IMCO's, tort claimants would
favor the Conference proposal.
Balanced against this analysis is the significant difference in the
burdens for establishing "privity or knowledge" under each system.
Under the Convention, the burden shifts to the claimant to establish
the owner's intent or recklessness as a causation of the casualty. Put-
ting both factors together, the result under IMCO would probably
mean:
(1) An increase in the number of cases in which an owner
could limit, 99
(2) an increase in the amount of the limitation fund, and
(3) an end to the possibility of property claimants being faced
with a literally worthless limitation fund in the event that the of-
fending vessel is lost.
The U.S. Delegation and Maritime Law Association would both sup-
port the IMCO Convention were the limitation amounts higher. 100
Given that those amounts are presently higher than the allowable
limits under the U.S. system, both groups would seemingly favor the
96. Id. at 6812-13.
97. See note 70 supra; In re: Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (The Torrey Canyon). The owners petitioned in New York District
Court to limit their liability to fifty dollars. This case was eventually settled after
another of the owner's vessels was attached in France.
98. See note 92 supra.
99. This would be because the Convention would replace the "privity or knowl-
edge" standard with an "intent" standard. Convention at Art. 4.
100. Status Report at 6812-13; Owen, supra, note 4 at Appendix II.
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IMCO Conference proposal over the present system, were the choice
simply between those two.
10 1
C. Insurers
Insurers have been given "owner" status by the Convention;
10 2 if
IMCO's proposal were adopted, insurers could limit their liability.
Inasmuch as that novation would obviate the direct-action loop-hole,
the interest of insurers would probably favor adoption of the IMCO
Convention.
Secondly, not only would an owner's intent or recklessness bar
his right to limit under IMCO, but such conduct would also probably
forfeit his insurance coverage.' 03 That standard ensures that an own-
er's incentive to protect his insurance coverage, will also safeguard
the insurer's derivative right to limit liability.
D. Federal Government
The interest of the federal government can best be viewed in
terms of what has recently emerged as the National Transportation
Policy. 10 4 That policy involves safeguarding twin public aims: com-
merce and national defense.
Promoting seaborne commerce was a major factor in the forma-
tion of limitation of liability rules.' 0 5 Developments since that
period, if not outdating the Act's purposes, have at least undercut the
need to sustain limitation of liability as a major part of assisting
maritime commerce. The means available to U.S. carriers to compete
with foreign flag carriers in both foreign and domestic commerce have
grown with an increase in the following: (1) government subsidies,
10 6
(2) the development of corporate structures, 10 7 and (3) the use of in-
surance. 10 8 Moreover, there is "a basic hostility to the special
101. See text accompanying note 116 infra. For a general discussion on the advan-
tages of compromise, see Martucci, The Maritime Law Association's Proposed Statute
on Shipowners" Limitation of Liability: A Practical Alternative to the IMCO Conven-
tion, 10 LI w AM. 839 (1978).
102. Convention at Art. 1(6).
103. For a general discussion of the "commercial insurability approach," see
Owen, supra note 4, at 1-10-11.
104. 49 U.S.C. § 1; Inter-State Commerce Act Section 15(a)(3).
105. See notes 5 & 6 supra, and accompanying text.
106. Two major government subsidies are (1) the construction differential subsidy,
and (2) the operating differential subsidy.
107. See Hearings, supra note 70.
108. See Kierr, supra note 19, at 643-45.
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privilege of limitation of liability granted to ship owners by the Act of
1851. This is a privilege not enjoyed by the railroads, truckers, bus
operators or airlines (except with respect to international passen-
gers)." 109
Despite what some might term "economic obsolescence," 110
Congress has ascertained that limitation of liability is vital to the in-
terest of U.S. carriers in competing with foreign shipping.11 1 Given
that the maintenance of a strong merchant fleet is in the best interest
of national commerce, abolition of the right to limit liability seems
highly unlikely. The solution, therefore, calls for balancing commerce
interests in subsidizing the U.S. fleet through the limitation privilege,
against the interests of both tort claimants and domestic competitors.
The IMCO proposal would improve the lot of each of these latter
groups by increasing the available fund. 112 At the same time carriers
are provided benefits in the "intent" standard.
1 13
The same analysis would apply to the second prong of the Na-
tional Transportation Policy-national defense. The underlying
rationale is that the greater the number of ships owned by U.S. citi-
zens, the larger the fleet from which to draw ships in the event of a
national emergency." 4  Therefore, inasmuch as limitation favors U.S.
shipowners, it will strengthen national defense.
In sum, the IMCO Convention would improve the state of U.S.
limitation of liability law for each of several major interest groups: (1)
Owners would only be denied the privilege if a claimant could prove
intent or recklessness; (2) tort claimants would usually have a larger
fund to claim against, and would never face a worthless fund; (3) in-
surers would be granted the privilege of limiting liability; and (4) the
national interest of fostering commerce and defense would benefit be-
cause (a) the system would conform more closely to the present state
of the industry, quelling much of the criticism of the U.S. law, and (b)
109. Hearings, supra note 70. It is important to note that shipowners aren't the
only group afforded the limitation privilege in the United States. In addition to in-
ternational air carriers (Warsaw Convention of 1929), nuclear equipment operators
and distributors (42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976)) and shipyards (liability generally limited by
contract to $300,000) may limit liability.
110. GILMORE & BLACK, supro note 8, at 822-23.
111. "'The American Merchant Marine, already hard-pressed by foreign competi-
tion, would be struck a severe blow if repeal of our limitation statute forced it to
stand alone among the major maritime powers of the world in this respect.'" Hear-
ings, supra note 70.
112. See text accompanying notes 89-111, supra.
113. Convention at Art. 4.
114. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1241-16 (1970).
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
carriers would still receive what amounts to a substantial subsidy-
essential to the maintenance and development of a strong merchant
fleet.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States limitation of liability law is fraught with am-
biguity and disharmony among the judicial circuits. This lack of uni-
formity fosters both a basic sense of unfairness' in the system, and an
incentive for forum shopping. The limitation law is grounded on
policies which developments in corporate structures and government
subsidies have, to a large degree, outdated. As outlined above, the
IMCO Convention could solve many major problems in our current
system,
The general sentiment of the United States Delegation is that
while both the basic structure and specific provisions of the Conven-
tion are acceptable, the amounts of limitation are too low.11 5 Given
the relative affluence of the United States, however, any amount in-
tended to be a compromise for all shipping nations will necessarily
fall below our own standards. A domestic compromise solution that
favored the interests of tort claimants by providing higher amounts
would have corresponding negative effects. First, higher amounts
would dilute the limitation privilege to the point of being a nominal
benefit at best. Second, such a domestic compromise solution would
block progress towards international uniformity.
The value of international uniformity includes curbing incentives
to forum shop, obviating the need for shipowners to post multiple
bonds, 116 and increasing the predictability with which shippers, in-
surers, and investors can approach maritime commerce. Limitation
should not be treated as a distinct sphere of so-called private interna-
tional law to be legislated domestically, but should be internationally
uniform in order to promote industry stability."17 The prevalent
usage of U.S. ports and admiralty courts compels United States ratifi-
cation of the IMCO Convention as a necessary step in that stabliza-
tion process.
115. Status Report at 6812-13.
116. Convention at Art. 13.
117. Cf. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315
(1970)-the United States implementing legislation of the International Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading for the Carriage of Goods
by Sea, done Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155. For an
excellent general discussion of uniformity in internationalcommerce, see Berman &
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The Maritime Law Association has recently proposed a limitation
of liability statute based on the IMCO Convention. 118 While the
proposal may improve many salient aspects of the IMCO Convention,
the United States should not readily undertake unilateral domestic
legislation. If Congress favors the MLA proposal over the Conven-
tion, and if the Convention fails to receive a sufficient number of
ratifications to enter into force, it is submitted that the interests of
both the United States, and maritime commerce in general, would
benefit from negotiation of a suitable limitation system in a sub-
sequent international forum.
Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19
HARv. INT'T L.J. 221 (1978).
118. The proposal was circulated prior to the November MLA meeting at
Freeport, Bahamas. During that meeting the Joint Committees of the Comite
Maritime International and the Limitation of Liability conducted an open panel dis-
cussion on the proposed statute. For an examination of that statute, see Martucci,
supra note 101.
APPENDIX A.
CONVENTION ON LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
FOR MARITIME
CLAIMS, 1976*
The States Parties to this Convention,
HAVING RECOGNIZED the desirability of determining by
agreement certain uniform rules relating to the limitation of liability
for maritime claims;
HAVE DECIDED to conclude a Convention for this purpose
and have thereto agreed as follows:
CHAPTER I. THE RIGHT OF LIMITATION
Article 1
Persons entitled to limit liability
1. Shipowners and salvors, as hereinafter defined, may limit
their liability in accordance with the rules of this Convention for
claims set out in Article 2.
2. The term shipowner shall mean the owner, charterer, man-
ager and operator of a sea-going ship.
3. Salvor shall mean any person rendering services in direct
connexion with salvage operations. Salvage operations shall also in-
clude operations referred to in Article 2, paragraph I(d), (e) and (f).
4. If any claims set out in Article 2 are made against any person
for whose act, neglect or default the shipowner or salvor is responsi-
ble, such person shall be entitled to avail himself to the limitation of
liability provided for in this Convention.
5. In this Convention the liability of a shipowner shall include
liability in an action brought against the vessel herself.
6. An insurer of liability for claims subject to limitation in accor-
dance with the rules of this Convention shall be entitled to the ben-
efits of this Convention to the same extent as the assured himself.
7. The act of invoking limitation of liability shall not constitute
an admission of liability.




Claims subject to limitation
1. Subject to Article*3 and 4 the following claims, whatever the
basis of liability may be, shall be subject to limitation of liability:
(a) claims in respect to loss of life or personal injury or loss of or
damage to property (including damage to harbour works, basins and
waterways and aids to navigation), occurring on board or in direct
connexion with the operation of the ship or with salvage operations,
and consequential loss resulting therefrom;
(b) claims in respect of loss resulting from delay in the carriage
by sea of cargo, passengers or their luggage;
(c) claims in respect of other loss resulting from infringement of
rights other than contractual rights, occurring in direct connexion
with the operation of the ship or salvage operations;
(d) claims in respect of the raising, removal, destruction or the
rendering harmless of a ship which is sunk, wrecked, stranded or
abandoned, including anything that is or has been on board such
ship;
(e) claims in respect of the removal, destruction or the rendering
harmless of the cargo of the ship;
(f) claims of a person other than the person liable in respect of
measures taken in order to avert or minimize loss for which the per-
son liable may limit his liability in accordance with this Convention,
and further loss caused by such measures.
2. Claims set out in paragraph 1 shall be subject to limitation of
liability even if brought by way of recourse or for indemnity under a
contract or otherwise. However, claims set out under paragraphs 1(d),
(e) and (f) shall not be subject to limitation of liability to the extent
that they relate to remuneration under a contract with the person
liable.
Article 3
Claims excepted from limitation
The rules of this Convention shall not apply to:
(a) claims for salvage or contribution in general average;
(b) claims for oil pollution damage within the meaning of the In-
ternational Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
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dated 29 November -1969 or of any amendment or Protocol thereto
which is in force;
(c) claims subject to any international convention or national
legislation governing or prohibiting limitation of liability for nuclear
damage;
(d) claims against the shipowner or a nuclear ship for nuclear
damage;
(e) claims by servants of the shipowners or salvor whose duties
are connected with the ship or the salvage operations, including
claims of their heirs, dependants or other persons entitled to make
such claims, if under the law governing the contract of service be-
tween the shipowner or salvor and such servants the shipowner or
salvor is not entitled to limit his liability in respect of such claims, or
if he is by such law only permitted to limit his liability to an amount
greater than that provided for in Article 6.
Article 4
Conduct barring limitation
A person liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it is
proved that the loss resulted from his personal act or omission, com-
mitted with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with
knowledge that such loss would probably result.
Article 5
Counterclaims
Where a person entitled to limitation of liability under the rules
of this Convention has a claim against the claimant arising out of the
same occurrence, their respective claims shall be set off against each




1. The limits of liability for claims other than those mentioned in
Article 7, arising on any distinct occasion, shall be calculated as fol-
lows:
APPENDIX
(a) in respect of claims for loss of life or personal injury,
(i) 333,000 Units of Account for a shop with a tonnage not exceed-
ing 500 tons.
(ii) for a ship with a tonnage in excess thereof, the following
amount in addition to that mentioned in (i):
for each ton from 501 to 3,000 tons, 500 Units of Account;
for each ton from 3,001 to 30,000 tons, 333 Units of Ac-
count;
for each ton from 30,001 to 70,000 tons, 250 Units of Ac-
counts; and
for each ton in excess of 70,000 tons, 167 Units of Ac-
count,
(b) in respect of any other claims,
(i) 167,000 Units of Account for a ship with a tonnage not exceed-
ing 500 tons.
(ii) for a ship with a tonnage in excess thereof the following
amount in addition to that mentioned in (i):
for each ton from 501 to 30,000 tons, 167 Units of Ac-
count;
for each ton from 30,001 to 70,000 tons, 125 Units of Ac-
count; and
for each ton in excess of 70,000 tons, 83 Units of Account.
2. Where the amount calculated in accordance with paragraph
1(a) is insufficient to pay the claims mentioned therein in full, the
amount calculated in accordance with paragraph 1(b) shall be available
for payment of the unpaid balance of claims under paragraph 1(a) and
such unpaid balance shall rank rateably with claims mentioned under
paragraph 1(b).
3. However, without prejudice to the right of claims for loss of
life or personal injury according to paragraph 2, a State Party may
provide in its national law that claims in respect of damage to harbour
works, basins and waterways and aids to navigation shall have such
priority over other claims under paragraph 1(b) as in provided by that
law.
4. The limits of liability for any salvor not operating from any
ship or for any salvor operating solely on the ship to, or in respect of
which he is rendering salvage services, shall be calculated according
to a tonnage of 1,500 tons.
5. For the purpose of this Convention the ship's tonnage shall be
the gross tonnage calculated in accordance with the tonnage mea-
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surement rules contained in Annex I of the International Convention
on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969.
Article 7
The Limit for Passenger claims
1. In respect of claims arising on any distinct occasion for loss of
life or personal injury to passengers of a ship, the limit of liability of
the shipowner thereof shall be an amount of 46,666 Units of Account
multiplied by the number of passengers which the ship is authorized
to carry according to the ship's certificate, but not exceeding 25 mil-
lion Units of Account.
2. For the purpose of this Article "claims for loss of life or per-
sonal injury to passengers of a ship" shall mean any such claims
brought by or on behalf of any person carried in that ship:
(a) under a contract of passenger carriage, or
(b) who, with the consent of the carrier, is accompanying a vehi-




1. The Unit of Account referred to in Articles 6 and 7 is the
Special Drawing Right as defined by the International Monetary
Fund. The amounts mentioned in Articles 6 and 7 shall be converted
into the national currency of the State in which limitation is sought,
according to the value of that currency at the date the limitation fund
shall have been constituted, payment is made, or security is given
which under the law of that State is equivalent to such payment. The
value of a national currency in terms of the Special Drawing Right, of
a State Party which is a member of the International Monetary Fund,
shall be calculated in accordance with the method of valuation applied
by the International Monetary Fund in effect at the date in question
for its operations and transactions. The value of a national currency in
terms of the Special Drawing Right, of a State Party which is not a
member of the International Monetary Fund, shall be calculated in a
manner determined by that State Party.
2. Nevertheless, those States which are not members of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund and whose law does not permit the appli-
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cation of the provisions of paragraph 1 may, at the time of signature
without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval or at the
time of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession or at any time
thereafter, declare that the limits of liability provided for in this Con-
vention to be applied in their territories shall be fixed as follows:
(a) in respect of Article 6, paragraph 1(a) at an amount of:
(i) 5 million monetary units for a ship with a tonnage not
exceeding 500 tons;
(ii) for a ship with a tonnage in excess thereof, the following
amount in addition to that mentioned in (i):
for each ton from 501 to 3,000 tons, 7,500 monetary units;
for each ton from 3,001 to 30,000 tons, 5,000 monetary
units;
for each ton from 30,001 to 70,000 tons, 3,750 monetary
units; and
for each ton in excess of 70,000 tons, 2,500 monetary units;
and
(b) in respect of Article 6, paragraph 1(b), at an amount of:
(i) 2.5 million monetary units for a ship with a tonnage not
exceeding 500 tons;
(ii) for a ship with a tonnage in excess thereof, the following
amount in addition to that mentioned in (i):
for each ton from 501 to 30,000 tons, 2,500 monetary units;
for each ton from 30,001 to 70,000 tons, 1,850 monetary
units; and
for each ton in excess of 70,000 tons, 1,250 monetary units;
and
(c) in respect of Article 7, paragraph 1, at an amount of 700,000
monetary units multiplied by the number of passengers which the
ship is authorized to carry according to its certificate, but not exceed-
ing 375 million monetary units.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 6 apply correspondingly to sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.
3. The monetary unit referred to in paragraph 2 corresponds to
sixty-five and a half milligrammes of gold of millesimal fineness nine
hundred. The conversion of this sum into the national currency shall
be made according to the law of the State concerned.
4. The calculation mentioned in the last sentence of paragraph 1
and the conversion mentioned in paragraph 3 shall be made in such a
manner as to express in the national currency of the State Party as far
as possible the same real value for the amounts in Articles 6 and 7 as
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is expressed there in Units of Account. States Parties shall communi-
cate to the depositary the manner of calculation pursuant to para-
graph 1, or the result of the conversion in paragraph 3, -as the case
may be, at the time of the signature without reservation as to ratifica-
tion, acceptance or approval, or when depositing an instrument re-
ferred to in Article 16 and whenever there is a change in either.
Article 9
Aggregation of claims
1. The limits of liability determined in accordance with Article 6
shall apply to the aggregate of all claims which arise on any distinct
occasion:
(a) against the person or persons mentioned in paragraph 2 of
Article 1 and any person for whose act, neglect or default he or they
are responsible; or
(b) against the shipowner of a ship rendering salvage services
from that ship and the salvor or salvors operating from such ship and
any person for whose act, neglect or default he or they are responsi-
ble; or
(c) against the salvor or salvors who are not operating from a ship
or who are operating solely on the ship to, or in respect of which, the
salvage services are rendered and any person for whose act, neglect
or default he or they are responsible.
2. The limits of liability determined in accordance with Article 7
shall apply to the aggregate of all claims subject thereto which may
arise on any distinct occasion against the person or persons men-
tioned in paragraph 2 of Article 1 in respect of the ship referred to in
Article 7 and any person for whose act, neglect or default he or they
are responsible.
Article 10
Limitation of Liability without constitution of a limitation fund
1. Limitation of liability may be invoked notwithstanding that a
limitation fund as mentioned in Article 11 has not been constituted.
However, a State Party may provide in its national law that, where an
action is brought in its Courts to enforce a claim subject to limitation,
a person liable may only invoke the right to limit liability if a limita-
tion fund has been constituted in accordance with the provisions of
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this Convention or is constituted when the right to limit liability is
invoked.
2. If limitation of liability is invoked without the constitution of
a limitation fund, the provisions of Article 12 shall apply correspond-
ingly.
3. Questions of procedure arising under the rules of this Article
shall be decided in accordance with the national law of the State
Party in which action is brought.
CHAPTER III. THE LIMITATION FUND
Article 11
Constitution of the fund
1. Any person alleged to be liable may constitute a fund with the
Court or other competent authority in any State Party in which legal
proceedings are instituted in respect of claims subject to limitation.
The fund shall be constituted in the sum of such of the amounts set
out in Articles 6 and 7 as are applicable to claims for which that
person may be liable, together with interest thereon from the date of
the occurrence giving rise to the liability until the date of the con-
stitution of the fund. Any fund thus constituted shall be available only
for the payment of claims in respect of which limitation of liability can
be invoked.
2. A fund may be constituted, either by depositing the sum, or
by producing a guarantee acceptable under the legislation of the State
Party where the fund is constituted and considered to be adequate by
the Court or other competent authority.
3. A fund constituted by one of the persons mentioned in para-
graph 1(a), (b) or (c) or paragraph 2 of Article 9 or his insurer shall be
deemed constituted by all persons mentioned in paragraph 1(a), (b) or
(c) or paragraph 2, respectively.
Article 12
Distribution of the Fund
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 6
and of Article 7, the fund shall be distributed among the claimants in
proportion to their established claims against the fund.
2. If, before the fund is distributed, the person liable, or his
insurer, has settled a claim against the fund such person shall, up to
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
the amount he has paid, acquire by subrogation the rights which the
person so compensated would have enjoyed under this Convention.
3. The right of subrogation provided for in paragraph 2 may also
be exercised by persons other than those therein mentioned in re-
spect of any amount of compensation which they may have paid, but
only to the extent that such subrogation is permitted under the
applicable national law.
4. Where the person liable or any other person establishes that
he may be compelled to pay, at a later date, in whole or in part any
such amount of compensation with regard to which such person
would have enjoyed a right of subrogation pursuant to paragraphs 2
and 3 had the compensation been paid before the fund was distrib-
uted, the Court or other competent authority of the State where the
fund has been constituted may order that a sufficient sum shall be
provisionally set aside to enable such person at such later date to
enforce his claim against the fund.
Article 13
Bar to other actions
1. Where a limitation fund has been constituted in accordance
with Article 11, any person having made a claim against the fund
shall be barred from exercising any right in respect of such claim
against any other assets of a person by or on behalf of whom the fund
has been constituted.
2. After a limitation fund has been constituted in accordance
with Article 11, any ship or other property, belonging to a person on
behalf of whom the fund has been constituted, which has been ar-
rested or attached within the jurisdiction of a State Party for a claim
which may be raised against the fund, of any security given, may be
released by order of the Court or other competent authority of such
State. However, such release shall always be ordered if the limitation
fund has been constituted:
(a) at the port where the occurrence took place, or, if it took
place out of port, at the first port of call thereafter; or
(b) at the port of disembarkation in respect of claims for loss of
life or personal injury; or
(c) at the port of discharge in respect of damage to cargo; or
(d) in the State where the arrest is made.
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3. The rule of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall apply only if the claimant
may bring a claim against the limitation fund before the Court ad-
ministering that fund and the fund is actually available and freely
transferable in respect of that claim.
Article 14
Governing law
Subject to the provisions of this Chapter the rules relating to the
constitution and distribution of a limitation fund, and all rules of pro-
cedure in connexion therewith, shall be governed by the law of the
State Party in which the fund is constituted.
CHAPTER IV. SCOPE OF APPLICATION
Article 15
1. The Convention shall apply whenever any person referred to
in Article 1 seeks to limit his liability before the Court of a State
Party or seeks to procure the release of a ship or other property or
the discharge of any security given within the jursidiction of any such
State. Nevertheless, each State Party may exclude wholly or partially
from the application of this Convention any person referred to in Ar-
ticle 1, who at the time when the rules of this Convention are
invoked before the Courts of that State does not have his habitual
residence in a State Party, or does not have his principal place of
business in a State Party or any ship in relation to which the right of
limitation is invoked or whose release is sought and which does not at
the time specified above fly the flag of a State Party.
2. A State Party may regulate by specific provisions of national
law the system of limitation of liability to be applied to vessels which
are:
(a) according to the law of that State, ships intended for naviga-
tion on inland waterways;
(b) ships of less than 300 tons.
A State Party which makes use of the option provided for in this
paragraph shall inform the depositary of the limits of liability adopted
in its national legislation or of the fact that there are none.
3. A State Party ma, regulate by specific provisions of national
law the system of limitation of liability to be applied to claims arising
in cases in which interests of persons who are nationals of other
States Parties are in no way involved.
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4. The Courts. of a State Party shall not apply this Convention to
ships constructed for, or adapted to, and engaged in, drilling:
(a) when that State has established under its national legislation a
higher limit of liability than that otherwise provided for in Article 6;
or
(b) when that State has become party to an international conven-
tion regulating the system of liability in respect of such ships.
In a case to which sub-paragraph (a) applies that State Party shall
inform the depositary accordingly.
5. This Convention shall not apply to:
.(a) air-cushion vehicles;
(b) floating platforms constructed for the purpose of exploring or
exploiting the natural resources of the sea-bed or the subsoil thereof.
CHAPTER V. FINAL CLAUSES
Article 16
Signature, Ratification and Accession
1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States at
the Headquarters of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (hereinafter referred to as "the Organization") from 1
February 1977 until 31 December 1977 and shall thereafter remain
open for accession.
2. All States may become parties to this Convention by:
(a) signature without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or
approval; or
(b) signature subject to ratification, acceptance or approval fol-
lowed by ratification, acceptance or approval; or
(c) accession.
3. Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be ef-
fected by the deposit of a formal instrument to that effect with the




1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the
month following one year after the date on which twelve States have
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either signed it without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or
approval or have deposited the requisite instruments of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession.
2. For a State which deposits an instrument of ratification, ac-
ceptance, approval or accession, or signs without reservation as to
ratification, acceptance or approval, in respect of this Convention
after the requirements for entry into force have been met but prior to
the date of entry into force, the ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession or the signature without reservation as to ratification, accep-
tance or approval, shall take effect on the date of entry into force of
the Convention or on the first day of the month following the
ninetieth day after the date of the signature or the deposit of the
instrument, whichever is the later date.
3. For any State which subsequently becomes a Party to this
Convention, the Convention shall enter into force on the first day of
the month following the expiration of ninety days after the date when
such State deposited its instrument.
4. In respect of the relations between States which ratify, ac-
cept, or approve this Convention or accede to it, this Convention
shall replace and abrogate the International Convention relating to
the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Sea-going Ships, done at
Brussels on 10 October 1957, and the International Convention for
the Unification of certain Rules relating to the Limitation of Liability




1. Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification, accep-
tance, approval or accession, reserve the right to exclude the applica-
tion of Article 2 paragraph 1(d) and (e). No other reservations shall be
admissible to the substantive provisions of this Convention.
2. Reservations made at the time of signature are subject to con-
firmation upon ratification, acceptance or approval.
3. Any State which has made a reservation to this Convention
may withdraw it at any time by means of a notification addressed to
the Secretary-General. Such withdrawal shall take effect to the date
the notification is received. If the notification states that the with-
drawal of a reservation is to take effect on a date specified therein,
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and such date is later than the date the notification is received by the
Secretary-General, the withdrawal shall take effect on such later date.
Article 19
Denunciation
1. This Convention may be denounced by a State Party at any
time after one year from the date on which the Convention entered
into force for that Party.
2. Denunciation shall be effected by the deposit of an instru-
ment with the Secretary-General.
3. Denunciation shall take effect on the first day of the month
following the expiration of one year after the date of deposit of the




1. A Conference for the purpose of revising or amending this
Convention may be convened by the Organization.
2. The organization shall convene a Conference of the States
Parties to this Convention for revising or amending it as the request
of not less than one-third of the Parties.
3. After the date of the entry into force of an amendment to this
Convention, any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession deposited shall be deemed to apply to the Convention as
amended, unless a contrary intention is expressed in the instrument.
Article 21
Revision of the limitation amounts and of
Unit of Account of monetary unit
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 20, a Conference
only for the purposes of altering the amounts specified in Articles 6
and 7 and in Article 8, paragraph 2, or of substituting either or both
of the Units defined in Article 8, paragraphs 1 and 2, by other units
shall be convened by the Organization in accordance with paragraphs
2 and 3 of this Article. An alteration of the amounts shall be made
only because of a significant change in their real value.
APPENDIX
2. The Organization shall convene such a Conference at the re-
quest of not less than one-fourth of the States Parties.
3. A decision to alter the amounts or to substitute the Units by
other units of account shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the
States Parties present and voting in such Conference.
4, Any state depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession to the Convention, after entry into force of an
amendment, shall apply the Convention as amended.
Article 22
Depositary
1. This Convention shall be deposited with the Secretary-
General.
2. The Secretary-General shall:
(a) transmit certified true copies of this Convention to all States
which were invited to attend the Conference on Limitation of
Liability for maritime Claims and to any other States which
accede to this Convention;
(b) inform all States which have signed or acceded to this Con-
vention of:
(i) each new signature and each deposit of an instrument
and any reservation thereto together with the date
thereof;
(ii) the date of entry into force of this Convention or any
amendment thereto;
(iii) any denunciation of this Convention and the date on
which it takes effect;
(iv) any amendment adopted in conformity with Articles 20
or 21;
(v) any communication called for by any Article of this Con-
venmtion.
3. Upon entry into force of this Convention, a certified true copy
thereof shall be transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Sec-
retariat of the United Nations for registration and publication in ac-
cordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
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Article 23
Languages
This Convention is established in a single original in the English,
French, Russian and Spanish languages, each text being equally au-
thentic.
DONE AT LONDON this nineteenth day of November one
thousand nine hundred and seventy-six.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned being duly authorized
for that purpose have signed this Convention.
APPENDIX B.
46 U.S.C. § 183. Amount of liability; loss of life or bodily injury;
privity imputed to owner; "seagoing vessel."
(a) The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or
foreign, for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of
any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board of such
vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act,
matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or
incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners,
shall not, except in the cases provided for in subsection (b) of this
section, exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in
such vessel, and her freight then pending.
(b) In the case of any seagoing vessel, if the amount of the own-
er's liability as limited under subsection (a) of this section is insuffi-
cient to pay all losses in full, and the portion of such amount applica-
ble to the payment of losses in respect of loss of life or bodily injury
is less than $60 per ton of such vessel's tonnage, such portion shall be
increased to an amount equal to $60 per ton, to be available only for
the payment of losses in respect of life or bodily injury. If such por-
tion so increased is insufficient to pay such losses in full, they shall be
paid therefrom in proportion to their respective amounts.
(c) For the purposes of this section the tonnage of a seagoing
steam or motor vessel shall be her gross tonnage without deduction
on account of engine room, and the tonnage of a seagoing sailing
vessel shall be her registered tonnage: Provided, That there shall not
be included in such tonnage any space occupied by seamen or ap-
prentices and appropriated to their use.
(d) The owner of any such seagoing vessel shall be liable in re-
spect of loss of life or bodily injury arising on distinct occasions to the
same extent as if no other loss of life or bodily injury had arisen.
(e) In respect of loss of life or bodily injury the privity or knowl-
edge of the master of a seagoing vessel or of the superintendent or
managing agent of the owner thereof, at or prior to the commence-
ment of each voyage, shall be deemed conclusively the privity or
knowledge of the owner of such vessel.
() As used in subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this section and
in section 183b of this title, the term "seagoing vessel" shall not in-
clude pleasure yachts, tugs, towboats, towing vessels, tank vessels,
fishing vessels or their tenders, self-propelled lighters, nondescript
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self-propelled vessels, canal boats, scows, car floats, barges, lighters,
or nondescript non-self-propelled vessels, even though the same may
be seagoing vessels within the meaning of such term as used in sec-
tion 188 of this title. R.S. § 4283; Aug. 29, 1935, c. 804, § 1, 49 Stat.
960; June 5, 1936, c. 521, § 1, 49 Stat. 1479.
